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THE MERCANTILE USE OF THE CHATTEL MORTGAGE ON AN
OPEN STOCK
i. The Legalistic Problems. A mortgage of an open Stock involves
at least two variations from the customary chattel mortgage transaction
in that it requires a mortgage of future or after acquired goods, and
that it empowers the mortgagor in possession to sell the encumbered
'The validity of a mortgage of future goods now in potential possession
was early upheld. Grantham v. Hawley (1616, K. B.) Hob. 132. In general
the owner of land may mortgage the crop growing upon it. Hall v. Glass
(1899) 12.3 Calif. 500, 56 Pac. 336; Kimball v. Sattley (1883) 55 Vt. 285. Or
crops as yet unplanted. National Bank of Wheaton v. Elkins (1916) 37 S. D.
479, 159 N. W. 6o; Rountree v. Britt (1886) 94 N. C. 1o4; contra: Littlefield v.
Lemley (898) 75 Mo. App. 511. Statutes in some states expressly permit
such mortgages. Ala. Acts 1889, no. 44. Others prohibit them. Minn. Gen.
[1753
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goods. Qui non habet ille non dat expresses the result and'voices the
objection of those cases which at common law denied the validity of
the mortgage on after acquired goods. Title was conceived of as quasi-
tangible, an indivisible something passed from hand to hand. If there
were no goods there could be no title. And if title could not pass to
the mortgagee with the conclusion of the mortgage transaction, there
could be no mortgage.2  That materialistic logic was impeccable.3
Thus in English common law the mortgage of after acquired goods
freed from any problem of a power to sell invested in the mortgagor
was said to be invalid even as between the parties.4 And such decisions
prevailed until the House of Lords introduced the doctrine of equit-
able liens and protected the mortgagee against attaching creditors of
the mortgagor.- In this country the mortgages likewise have been
said to be void even as between the parties, 6 although some of the
Sts. 1894, sec. 4154. But see Ambuehl v. Matthews (889) 41 Minn. 537, 43
N. W. 477. So the owner of an equitable interest in land may mortgage the
crops. Fields v. Karter (1898) 121 Ala. 329, 25 So. 800; see Clowney v.
Rivers (1924, S. C.) 123 S. E. 759 (rent cotton). The owner of sheep may
mortgige the wool to grow upon them; but not the wool to grow upon sheep
he may thereafter buy. Cf. Granthamn v. Hawley, supra; Jones Chattel
Mortgages (5th ed. igo8) 203. But the owner of clay in a brick yard has not
such potential interest in the finished brick as to enable him to give a valid mort-
gage on bricks to be manufactured in the future. Townsend v. Allen (igoo) 62
Kan. 311, 62 Pac. ioo8. This doctrine of potential possession seems a frank
exception to the common law rule that one Zannot mortgage what he does
not have. See Andrews v. Newcomb (1865) 32 N. Y. 417, 42I; Uniform Sales
Act, sec. 5 (3). It was generally held that there could be no valid assignment
of future wages or earnings. Mulhall v. Quinn (1854) 67 Mass. io5. Unless
the assignor had a contract under which he would receive the wages. Hartley
v. Tapley (1854) 68 Mass. 565; but see Sandwichz Mfg. Co. v. Robinson (i8gi)
83 Iowa, 567, 49 N. W. 1O31 (no contract necessary). We shall not further
deal here with these types of future or after acquired goods nor cite any
cases involving them.
'"When goods are sold with a chattel mortgage back, the vendee has title to
the goods, at least in theory, for some space of time; he then transfers the title
or a lien by way of security to the original vendor." Magill, Selling on Credit-
Legal Advantages (1923) 8 CORN. L. QuART. 2io, 221.
'This conception of title has led writers to maintain that one who had not
title could not give or pass title. And when the positive decisions of courts
indicated, for example, that one who had purchased a negotiable instrument
from a thief had title, ergo the thief must have had title. See Chafee, Rights
in Overdue Paper (1918) 31 HARv. L. REv. 1104, 1112.
'The general rule was stated that no chattel mortgage could be executed
which would bind personal property not belonging to the mortgagor. Lunn
v. Thornton (1845, C. P.) I C. B. 379 (mortgagor against mortgagee) . .... "it
is a common learning in the law, that a man cannot grant or. charge that
which he hath not.' Perkins, Conveyancing (i5th ed. 1792) sec. 65.
'Holroyd v. Marshall (x862) io H. L. Cas. 191.
'These statements generally appear in cases involving the rights of third
persons. Thus the mortgagee not in possession cannot maintain trover against
one interfering with the after acquired goods. Williams v. Briggs (1877) I
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holdings appended "void for indefiniteness."'7  This invalidity however,
did not defeat the mortgagee's right of satisfaction. The debt could
be sued upon, judgment secured, and execution levied upon all of the
mortgagor's property." But while the invalidity of the mortgage did
not prevent the mortgagee's ultimate recovery, it had some practical
disadvantages: a valid lien gave security pending suit and did not
necessitate new, expensive, and possibly hazardous proceedings.
Courts in code states, where fusion between law and equity had been
omewhat effected, sustained the mortgage I etween the parties. 9
These courts harbored the notion that possession without title was
fraudulent, at least a badge of fraud,10 and that one relying upon the
R. I. 476 (voluntary assignee or mortgagor); Deeley v. Dwight (892) x32
N. Y. 59, 3o N. E. 258 (purchaser from mortgagor). Nor replevin. Cf.
National Bank of Deposit v. Rogers (1896, ist Dept.) i App. Div. 623, 37 N. Y.
Supp. 365 (assignee of mortgagor for antecedent debt). Nor trespass.
Hamilton v. Rogers (i855) 8 Md. 301 (attaching creditors); but see Abbott
v. Goodwin (1841) 2o Me. 408 (ibid.) contra.
'A mortgage professing to cover the "scythes, iron, steel and coal" then
owned and also "all scythes, steel, iron and coal" which may be purchased in
lieu of aforesaid property was held void for uncertainty in Otis v. Sill (1849,
N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 8 Barb. io2, 113 (mortgagee against creditor).
' Nor is the mortgagee ordinarily required to elect whether he will seize the
goods as his own nuder the mortgage or levy on them as the mortgagor's
under a judgment. Case Threshing Machine Co. v. Johnson (1913) 152 Wis.
8, 139 N. W. 445; Magill, op. cit. supra note 2, at p. 222; but see Evans v.
Warren (1877) 122 Mass. 3o3.
'As between the parties the mortgagee can secure possession by replevin.
Judge v. Jones (1897) 99 Tenn. 2o, 42 S. W. 4; Campbell v. Quinton (i896) 4
Kan. App. 317. And he can maintain a "law" action against persons taking
from the mortgagor with notice. Ludwig v. Kipp (i88o, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 20
Hun. 265 (co-convertor with mortgagor); Ludlum v. Rothschild (1889) 41
Minn. 218, 43 N. W. 137 (mortgagee from purchaser with notice); Fuller v.
Rhodes (i889) 78 Mich. 36, 43 N. W. 1o85 (creditor with constructive notice
by recordation); Wiggins Co. v. McMinnville Motor Co. (1924, Or.) 225 Pac.
314 (creditor with actual notice). Compare the cases cited in note 6, supra.
"*Separation of possession from ownership was early held fraudulent.
Twyne's Case (i6oi, Star Ch.) 3 Coke, 8o6. At one time in England it was
held conclusively fraudulent as against the creditors of the one in possession.
Edwards v. Harben (788, K. B.) 2 T. R. 587 (conditional sale). This
was later overruled, Martindale v. Booth (832, K. B.) 3 B. & A. 498.
In the United States, in general, possession unaccompanied by ownership, is
not fraudulent per se. See Williston, Sales (2d ed. 1924) sec. 353 if. But
some courts of equity have adopted a principle, labelled estoppel, which enables
creditors to be satisfied out of the property of their debtor, who was allowed
by another to remain in possession of goods under such circumstances as
to make him the apparent owner. Frelinghuysen v. Nugent (1888, D. N. J.)
36 Fed. 229; Robinson v. Elliott 1(1874, U. S.) 22 Wall. 513. The basis of
the rule is the belief that men get credit for what they apparently own and
possess. See Casey v. Cavaroc (877) 96 U. S. 467. Nor is it necessary that
the creditor establish that he gave credit relying upon such possession. Martin
v. Mathoit (1826, Pa. Sup. Ct.) 14 Serg. & R. 214; Williams v. Kirk (1897)
68 Mo. App. 457.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
possession of goods by another as indicia of prosperity should be satis-
fied ahead of the one who had made possible such representation.1
Bona fide purchasers of the after acquired goods were thus protected.
2
The creditors of the mortgagor, who fell into various categories: prior,
contemporaneous, and subsequent to the mortgage, or to its recorda-
tion, and who were with or without notice, in general were protected
from the mortgagee's claim, but not universally or in all jurisdictions.'
3
Where the mortgagee subsequent to the mortgage had taken possession
of the goods, or some other sufficient horus actus intervened, the mort-
gagee was usually'4 but not unanimously protected.35 The National
'In almost all states recording statutes have been passed to enable the
mortgagor to remain in possession. Jones, op. cit. supra note i, sec. 9o ff.
But in some states the presunption of fraud despite the recordation, still
remains to be overcome. Wood v. Lowry (1837, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 17 Wend. 492;
Horton v. Williams (1875) 21 Minn. 187-; Sanford v. Jensen (1896) 49 .Nebr.
766, 69 N. W. io8; cf. Jones v. Richardson (1845, Mass.) 3O Metc. 481; see
note 23, infra.
"Deeley v. Dwight, supra note 6; Spinney v. Cook (913) iio Me. 406,
86 Atl. 517; Spinney v. Meloon (i9o7) 74 N. H. 384, 68 Atl. 410; Single v.
Phelps (1866) 20 Wis. 398.
"3Where the mortgagor was insolvent the mortgagee was held to have
no preferred claim as against other creditors. In re Avery Plow Co. (I912,
N. D. Tex.) 2o2 Fed. 996; American. Surety Co. v. Worcester Cycle Co. (igoo,
D. Conn.) ioo Fed. 40; Hogg v. Fuller (1915) 17 Ga. App. 442, 87 S. E. 760;
In re Thompson (194) 64 Iowa, 20, 145 N. W. 76; Crocker v. Hopps (1893)
78 Md. 260, 28 Atl. 99. And in contests with individual claimant creditors the
mortgagee was held not to prevail against prior creditors. Penton v. Hall
(1913) 14o Ga. 235, 78 S. E. 917; Wender Blue Gen Co. v. Louisville Property
Co. (N1o) 137 KY. 339, 125 S. W. 732; First National Bank v. Lindenstruth
(1894) 79 Md. 336, 28 Atl. 807. Nor against subsequent creditors. Wedge-
wood v. Citizens National Bank (189o) 29 Nebr. 165, 45 N. W. 289; cf. New
England Bank v. Northwestern Bank (3902) 171 Mo. 307, 71 S. W. 191
(mortgagee of non-existent property); Westinghouse Electric Co. v. Brooklyn
Rapid Transit Co. (ig2, S. D. N. Y.) 291 Fed. 863. And even though they
had actual knowledge. New Lincoln Hotel Co. v. Shears (1899) 57 Nebr.
478, 78 N. W. 25. Nor in these cases of indistinguishable attaching creditors.
Purcell's Admstr. v. Mather (186o) 35 Ala. 570; Christian & Craft Co. v.
Michael & Lyons (I898) I2 Ala. 84, 25 So. 571. Hunt v. Bullock (186o) 23
Ill. 320; Patterson v. Louisville Trust Co. (1895) 7 Ky. L. 234; Jones v.
Richardson, supra note I I.
" Chapman v. Weirner (855) 4 Ohio St. 481 (mortgagee against creditors);
Dobyns v. Meyer (1888) 95 Mo. 132 (ibid.); cf. Hope v. Hayley (1856, Q. B.)
5 El. & B1. 829. So if the mortgagee takes possession under a power granted
in the mortgage he prevails. Leland v. Collver (1876) 34 Mich. 418 (purchaser
with notice against mortgagee); Burrill v. Whitcomb (39o5) Ioo Me. 286, 6x
Atl. 678 (mortgagee against creditor); Thompson v. Foerstel (188i) IO Mo.
App. 290. Or with the consent of the mortgagee. Barton v. Sitlington (1895)
128 Mo. 364, 30 S. W. 514, But probably mere momentary delivery to the
mortgagee with immediate redelivery to the mortgagor is not sufficient. Griffith
v. Douglass (1882) 73 Me. 532 The intervening act need not be, however,
the voluntary act of the mortgagor. It is said to be sufficient if possession is
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Bankruptcy Act prohibiting preferences cast doubt upon this privilege
of the mortgagee if exercised within the statutory term.' 6
Other courts, however, have interposed, and following the doctrine
of Holroyd v. Marshall have allowed the mortgagee to prevail against
certain creditors of the mortgagor, although the mortgagee had not taken
possession of the goods or the mortgager done any new act to effectuate
the charge.28 Massachusetts remained adamant in requiring the inter-
vening act;"9 and New York perversely enough has enforced the
taken by the mortgagee against the will of the mortgagor. Glenn, Rights and
Remedies of Creditors (1915) sec. 266 (the case cited does not sustain the
proposition) ; but see Jones, op. cit. supra note x, sec. 163, note 156. In some
states it is considered that the only effect of the mortgage of the after acquired
goods is to authorize the mortgagee to take possession. Moody v. Wright
(1847, Mass.) 13 Metc. 17.
"Stephens v. Perrine (1894) 143 N. Y. 476, 39 N. E. ii (prior creditors
against mortgagee); cf. Robinson v. Elliott, supra note io.
"*It has been suggested that if the mortgagee takes possession within four
months of bankruptcy he thereby gains a preference, prohibited under the
National Bankruptcy Act. Clark v. Grimes (1916, D. Md.) 232 Fed. igo; cf.
Jordan v. Federal Trust Co. (D. Mass. 1924) 296 Fed. 738. And that the
insolvent mortgagor's allocation of after acquired goods to the mortgage is an
act of. bankruptcy. In general see Williston, Transfers of After-Acquired
Personal Property (19o6) i9 HARv. L. REv. 557.
"? "The ground of the doctrine is that the mortgage .... in equity transfers
the beneficial interest to the mortgagee . . . . in accordance with the familiar
maxim that equity considers done that which ought to have been done" Jones,
op. cit. supra note I, 25o- "And as such courts consider that as having been
done that which ought to have been done .... they treated the assignment as
having been made." Thompson, J. in Thompson v. Foerstal (i88i) IO Mo. App.
290, 2W. It must be apparent, however, that this maxim states not the reason
for such holdings, but merely the result of some of the holdings.
'Mitchell v. Winslow (1847, D. Me.) 2 Story, 63o (mortgagee had taken
possession); Perry v. White (1892) iii N. C. 197, 16 S. E. 172 (purchaser at
mortgage sale against mortgagor); Scharfenburg v. Bishop (1872) 35 Iowa, 6o
(mortgagee had taken possession); First National Bank v. Turnbull (i88o Va.)
32 Grat. 695 (mortgagee against judgment creditor). Professor Magill suggests
that even where the mortgage has been recorded three different results have
ben reached. (i) The mortgagee prevails over all creditors who have not
acquired a property interest before recording. In re Bolstad (1915, W. D.
Wash.) 224 Fed. 283. (2) The mortgagee does not prevail against creditors
at the time of recordation, even though they acquire their lien subsequent to
recordation. Skilton v. Codington (igo6) 185 N. Y. 8o, 77 N. E. 790. (3) The
mortgagee does not prevail against any subsequent claim acquired before
recording and without notice. Dempsey v. Pforzheiiner (i89i) 86 Mich. 652,
49 N. W. 465. Magill, op. cit. supra note 2, at p. 2z3.
'Moody v. Wright, supra note 14; Blanchard v. Cook (1887) 144 Mass.
2o7. It is not required, however, that the intervening act shall be the voluntary
act of the mortgagor; it is sufficient if the mortgagee has taken possession.
Harriman v. Woburn Electric Co. (1895) 163 Mass. 85, 39 N. E. 1004. And
see Chynoweth v. Tenney (186o) IO Wis. 397; Roundy v. Converse (1888) 71
Wis. 524, 37 N. W. 81i.
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recorded mortgage against purchasers but not against creditors.20 It
is usually required that the mortgage be definite in the description of
the goods to be acquired and limit them to goods of the same class as
those now encumbered. 21  In many states the almost universal require-
ment of recordation seems to have had the same effect as taking posses-
sion by the mortgagee22 both as to purchasers and as to creditors,
although it has been held that a mortgage of after acquired goods is
repugnant and incongruous to the recording statutes. 23
'" The recorded mortgage is enforceable against subsequent purchasers, with
or without actual notice. Wisner v. Ocumpaugh (1877) 71 N. Y. 113 (actual
notice) ; Kribbs v. Alvord (i8go) 12o N. Y. 519 (no actual notice); Central
Trust Co. v. West India Co. (19ol) 169 N. Y. 3x4, 62 N. E. 387. But not
against creditors. Rochester Dist. Co. v. Rasey (1894) 142 N. Y. 570, 37 N. E.
632 (mortgaged crops); Titusville Iron Co. v. City of New York (1922) 207
N. Y. 203, Ioo N. E. 8o6. "It is settled that the New York rule is that a
mortgage of after acquired personal property is ineffective as against creditors
of the mortgagor." Mayer, J. in Pintsch v. Buffalo Gas Co. (1922, C. C. A. 2d)
28o Fed. 830, 835. The two rules have apparently grown up in separate com-
plrtments with little attempt at reconciliation of their consequences. See Stone,
The Equitable Mortgage in New York (1920) 20 CoL. L. REv. 519, 528. See
N. Y. Consol. Laws, 1923, ch. 34, secs. 23o, 23oa.
' The doctrine of Holroyd v. Marshall rests somewhat upon the idea of the
power of courts of equity to compel specific performance. Cf. Williamson v.
New Jersey South Ry. (1878) 29 N. J. Eq. 311. Two distinctions, however,
must be noted. The mortgagor does not promise to do any future act, and
the court in protecting the mortgagee does not order any additional act done.
But the goods to be acquired must be sufficiently described as to enable specific
performance. Phelps v. Murray (1877, Tenn. Ch.) 2 Coop. 746. Thus a
mortgage of "all other personal property which I may own or acquire" does
not create a valid lien on any after acquired property. Ferguson v. Wilson
(1899) 122 Mich. 97, So N. W. loo6; cf. Belding v. Reed (1865, Exch.) 3
Hurl. & Colt 954.
"But an agreement to mortgage everything on earth that the mortgagee
thereafter might acquire is not a security arrangement at all, rather does it
attempt to give the lender a lien upon the borrower's earning power itself;
it savors more of vassalage than of hypothecation." Glenn, op. cit. supra note
14, at p. 208.
"'The effect of recording is generally the same as delivery would be at
common law-his lien is valid against all persons, at least in the jurisdiction
where recorded." Magill, op. cit. supra note 2, at p. 223.
""The statute provides for filing as a substitute for 'an immediate delivery'
or 'an actual and continued change of possession of the things mortgaged'.
Such provisions seem to me to exclude the idea of a chattel mortgage upon
non-existent things, or that such an instrument could operate to defeat the
lien of an attaching, or an execution creditor upon subsequently acquired
property." Gray, J. in Rochester Dist. Co. v. Rasey, supra note 20, at p. 579.
"It is idle to say that a resort to the record would have shown the existence
of the mortgage, for men get credit by what they apparently own and possess."
Davis, J. in Robinson v. Elliott, supra note 1o, at p. 525; "Whatever delivery
and retention of possession will enable the mortgagee to hold will be equally held
by the recorded mortgage. But what cannot be delivered and retained cannot
be recorded as what is to be mortgaged. The statute thus making one the
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The bestowal of the power to sell upon the mortgagor in possession
has been said to be repugnant to the idea of a mortgage.2 4 But neither
a mortgage nor any other legal device is to be judged by an a priori
determination of its character. If remedy be needed, it might be
afforded by changing the pre-conceived idea of a mortgage. Nor is
the concept of one in possession not having title but nevertheless hav-
ing the legal power to create an indefeasible interest in the transferee
an unfamiliar one. The factor in possession, the conditional vendee
empowered to sell, the thief in possession of negotiable paper, the sale
of goods at market overt, are current examples. Moreover, since the
mortgagee by the contract has authorized the mortgagor to sell, the
rights of the purchaser in the regular course of business can be sus-
tained upon simple principles of agency without the necessity of hold-
ing the mortgage void as did the recent case of Secord v. Northwes-
tern Tire C6. (1924, Minn.) i9 N. W. 84.2" Two other types of
transfers seem more difficult to reconcile with any theory of agency.
The bulk sales purchaser has been condemned by statute as not within
the usual course of business, and probably would not be protected.2 6
And one who takes a rather large portion of the encumbered stock
in the satisfaction of an antecedent debt, especially when the debt was
incurred after the recording of the mortgage, would not seem to be
within the agency protection extended to a purchaser in the course of
business.27
Where, however, the mortgagor uses the proceeds of the resale for
his own purposes and not in payment on the debt,2 8 except so far as
equivalent of the other the record is valid only to protect goods which at thegiving of the mortgage could be delivered and retained." Appleton, C. J. in
Grifith v. Douglass, supra note 14, at p. 535. Such language as this, it mustbe noted, would prohibit the use of such mercantile devices as conditional
sales, bailments and sales by factors.
" "The manifest tendency of such arrangements to defraud creditors, by
giving to the mortgagor a false credit, and their incongruity with the justand legal idea of a .mortgage, are, in my mind, sufficient to condemn them."
Denio, J. in Edgell v. Hart (1853) 9 N. Y. 213, 218.
'A similar circuity is found in the Uniform Conditional Sales Act, sec. 59:
"Every provision in any conditional sale reserving property in the seller shall
be void as to any purchaser from the buyer who without notice- of such
provision purchases the goods ....... When the contract of conditional sale
allows resale by the vendee, it would seem that the purchaser might be protected
without calling the reservation of title in the seller void.
Gregg v. Reisinger (1920) 1Io Wash. 68o, 188 Pac. 765; cf. Stewart &Hohnes Drug Co. v. Reed (1913) 74 Wash. 4O, 133 Pac. 577 (conditional sale);
National Cash Register Co. v. Stubbs (1923, Ga.) 116 S. E. 44 (ibid.).
"Cf. Miller v. Pancoast (i86i) 29 N. J. L. 250, 255.
' Where the mortgagor has been given the power to sell, the mortgage isnone the less valid as between the parties. Parker v. American Exchange
Bank (r894, Tex. Civ. App.) 27 S. W. 1071; Trice v. American Bank of El
Paso (1924, C. C. A. Tex.) 259 S. W. 993. And against takers from the
mortgagor with notice. Gregory v. Whedon (1879) 8 Nebr. 373 (purchaser);
182 YALE LAW JOURNAL
he maintains the stock to an agreed value, it may be argued that the
mortgageee has become an investor in the business and as such deserves
to hazard the risks of unsuccessful management. Thus the holder of a
bottomry bond in admiralty takes it subject to the risks of the voyage.
29
On the other hand the mortgagee of the real estate owned and
Hogdon v. Libby (1896) 69 N. H. 136, 43 Atl. 312 (assignee in insolvency).
But in general creditors and purchasers for value prevail over the mortgagee.
Cross v. Berry Demoville & Co. (igol) 132 Ala. 92, 31 So. 36; Chapin v.
Jenkins (1893) 5o Kan. 385, 31 Pac. 1084 (assignee for creditors); Kuh v.
Garvin (1894) 125 Mo. 547, 28 S. W. 847 (creditors prevail over those mort-
gagees who had not taken possession); Belknap v. Lyell (19o6) 89 Miss. 197,
42 So. 799; Enck v. Gerding (19o2) 67 Ohio St. 245, 65 N. E. 88o; Ranney-
Alton Co. v. Watson (19O1) IO Okla. 675, 65 Pac. 98; Citizens Trust Co.
v. Elders (1923) 212 Mo. App. 589, 259 S. W. 136. Such mortgages are
generally said to be fraudulent as a matter of law. Williston, Transfers of
After-Acquired Property (19o6) 19 HARv. L. REv. 557, 571, note i. But a
few cases do not condemn the mortgage as fraudulent per se. Louden v. Vinton
(I896) Io8 Mich. 313, 66 N. W. 222 (mortgagee had taken possession); First
National Bank v. Stewart (19o6) 13 N. M. 551, 86 Pac. 622 (mortgagor prevails
over attaching creditor). And some states sustain the mortgage against
creditors. Carroll v. Anderson (1923, Wyo.) 218 Pac. 1O38. Nor will a power
to sell the goods be implied from their perishable nature. Houck v. Heinsman
(893) 37 Neb. 463, 55 N. W. io6z Where the mortgage provides that the
mortgagor must account for the proceeds of sales many courts sustain the
mortgage. Hixon v. Hubbell (1896) 4 Okla. 224, 44 Pac. 222 (mortgagee had
taken possession); New Albany Woolen Mills v. Lewis (1896) 99 Ky. 398, 36
S. W. 12 (ibid.); Currie v. Bowman (1894) 25 Or. 364, 35 Pac. 848; Rock
Island Bank v. Powers (1896) 134 Mo. 432, 34 S. W. 869 (creditors prevail
over mortgagee). And it may be sufficient if the mortgagor account only for
the net proceeds of such sale. See Manhattan Brass Co. v. Webster Co. (x889)
37 Mo. App. 145. But if the mortgagor fails to so account with the mortgagee's
knowledge the mortgage is invalidated. Ryan v. Rogers (i9o8) 14 Idaho, 309,
94 Pac. 427. But not if the mortgagee was unaware of the default. -Atchison
Saddlery Co. v. Gray (igoi) 63 Kan. 79, 64 Pac. 987. Where the mortgage
contains an agreement by the mortgagor to maintain the stock to a certain
value some courts have held it to imply a power to sell and thus invalidate the
mortgage. Garden v. Bodwing's Admr. (1876) 9 W. Va. 121. Other courts
do not make such an inference. Kalk v. Fielding (88o) 5o Wis. 339; cf
-
.$affray v. Greenbaum (1884) 64 Iowa, 492. And such provisions have been
held valid. Fleisher Bros. v. Hinde (igo6) 122 Mo. App. 218, 98 S. W. 25;
contra: Skilton v. Coddington, supra note 18. Where the mortgagee has taken
possession prior to the attachment by creditors a few courts have held it
ineffectual, denying power to validate the held void transaction. Rathbun v.
Berry (892) 49 Kan. 735, 31 Pac. 679; Wilson v. Voight (1886) 9 Colo. 614.
Others have protected the mortgagee in possession. Francisco v. Ryan (I896)
54 Ohio St. 307, 43 N. E. 1045; Louden v. Vinton, supra; Hixon v. Hubbell,
supra; New Albany Woolen Mills v. Lewis, supra. So as to the effect of record-
ing-some courts have held it ineffectual to validate the void mortgage. Freeman v.
Rawson (855) 5 Ohio St. I; Duncan Wyatt & Co. v. Taylor (1885) 63 Texas,
645; but see Mitchell v. Winslow, supra note 18.
The Dora (1887, E. D. La.) 34 Fed. 343; Hughes, Admiralty Law (2d ed.
192o) 384, 394; see Beach, Relative Priority of Maritime Liens (1924) 33 Yale
Law Journal, 84r.
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occupied by a mercantile concern is not subject to the risks of the
business. The mortgage of an open stock of goods is essentially a
mortgage on the going concern value, only in event of catastrophe is
it contemplated that resort shall be had to the goods. The lender,
instead of putting in his goods as a capital contribution, puts them in only
when his risk is secured by a mortgage. The commercial enterprise
thus embarks with a first lien in favor of one of its investors on all
of its property. The courts cannot refuse such a prior lien if there
is no more than a recorded mortgage upon then existing tangible
goods; but when after required goods are sought to be added and a
power to sell inserted, some have held the lien on all of the goods
void;30 others, while recognizing the lien as to the presently owned
goods,3 ' have refused to permit the after acquired goods to be realized
on ahead of the creditors. But the legal problems can scarcely be
solved until the mercantile function of this instrument of credit is
known. If it alone affords the small merchant a feasible way of
financing himself and yet securing his wholesalers, there are cogent
reasons for sustaining its use.3 2
(To be continued) J. F. C.
DOES THE 33RD SECTION OF THE MERCHANT MARINE ACT (THE
JONES ACT) APPLY TO PROCEEDINGS IN ADMIRALTY?
It is proposed to discuss a portion of the reasoning of the United
States Supreme Court in the case of Panama Railroad Conmpany v.
Johnson (1924) 264 U. S. 375, 44 Sup. Ct. 391, construing the above act.
The statute is as follows:'
"That any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of
his employment may, at his election, maintain an action for damages
at law, with the right of trial by jury, and in such action all statutes of
the United States modifying or extending the common law right or
remedy in cases of personal injury to railway employees shall apply;
and in case of the death of any seaman as a result of such personal
injury the personal representative of such seaman may maintain an
action for damages at law with the right of trial by jury, and in such
action all statutes of the United States conferring or regulating the
right of action for death in the case of railway employees shall be
'Stein v. Munch (1878) 24 Minn. 390; Edgell v. Hart (1853) 9 N. Y. 213";
Wilson v. Voight, supra note 28.
See Hayes v. Westcott (189o) 91 Ala. 143, 8 So. 337; 5 R C. L. 438, note 8.
="Many small merchants, especially beginners in business, have no other
means of securing their creditors for the stock they purchase, and can meet
their debts out of current sales. . . . To hold that a merchant cannot mortgage
his goods without closing his doors, would be to hold that no mortgage of a
merchant's stock can be made at all." Campbell, J. in Gay v. Bidwell (1859) 7
Mich. 519, 525.
,Act of March 4, 1915, sec. 2o (38 Stat. at L. 1185) as amended by Act of
June 5, 1920, sec. 33 (41 Stat. at L. lOO7).
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applicable. Jurisdicti6n in such actions shall be under the court of the
district in which the defendant employer resides, or in which his prin-
cipal office is located."*
Johnson was a seaman, and brought an action in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of New York on its common law
side to recover for injuries, received while at work on a vessel of the
Panama Railroad Company, due to an alleged defective ladder. The
principal office of the Company was in the Southern District. It
defended on the grounds:
(i) That the forum named in the act was exclusive and not a
mere matter of personal privilege which could be waived by a general
appearance;
(2) That the act was unconstitutional
(a) As destructive of the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction;
(b) As in violation of the Fifth Amendment;
(c) As too vague and uncertain to constitute due process of
law.
The Supreme Court held that the failure to appear specially waived
any question of the forum, and that the act was not obnoxious to the
constitutional objections urged against it. The writer is in accord
with the result at which the Court arrived. His only quarrel is with
a part of its reasoning which, in his judgment, was not necessary to
a vindication of the act, and which, he fears, may have an unfortunate
tendency.
The attack upon the act on the ground of its interference with the
admiralty jurisdiction is based upon the contention that it introduces
a new principle of liability into the admiralty law, and enables the
seaman to have the new principle litigated under a different system
from that prevailing in an admiralty court and in a different court,
or (as stated in the opinion) "It restricts the enforcement of rights
founded on them to actions at law, and thereby encroaches on the
admiralty jurisdiction intended by the Constitution."
The opinion first establishes clearly the right of Congress to modify
the general law of the sea within certain bounds, and concludes this
part of the discussion as follows :2
"Rightly understood the statute neither withdraws injuries to seamen
from the reach and operation of the maritime law, nor enables the
seamen to do" so. On the contrary, it brings into that law new rules
drawn from another system and extends to injured seamen a right to
invoke, at their election, either the relief accorded by the old rules or
that provided by the new rules."
But in answer to the contention that the act encroached on the juris-
'diction of the admiralty court by limiting the enforcement of the new
*Italics are those of the writer.
'Panama Ry. v. Johnson (ig94) 264 L. S. 375, 388, 44 Sup. Ct. 391, 394.
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right to a common law forum, the Court felt called upon to vindicate
the validity of the act by holding that it applied to libels in admiralty
as well as to actions at common law. Replying to the contrary con-
tention it says :3
"It must be conceded that the construction thus sought to be put
on the statute finds support in some of its words, and also that if it
be so construed a grave question will arise respecting its constitutional
validity . . . . The question arises, therefore, whether the statute is
fairly open to such a construction . . . . The course of legislation,
as exemplified in Section 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, Sections 563
(par. 8) and 711 (par. 3) of the Revised Statutes, and Sections 24
(par. 3) and 256 (par. 3) of the Judicial Code, always has been to
recognize the admiralty jurisdiction as open to the adjudication of all
maritime cases as a matter of course, and to permit a resort to common-
law remedies through appropriate proceedings in personam as a matter
of admissible grace. It therefore is reasonable to believe that had
Congress intended by this statute to withdraw rights of action founded
on the new rules from the admiralty jurisdiction and to make them
cognizable only on the common-law side of the courts, it would have
expressed that intention in terms befitting such a pronounced depar-
ture,--that is to say in terms unmistakably manifesting a purpose to
make the resort to common-law remedies compulsory, and not merely
permissible. But this was not done. On the contrary, the terms of
the statute in this regard are not imperative but permissive. It says
"may maintain" an action at law "with the right of trial by jury," the
import of which is that the injured seaman is permitted, but not
required to proceed on the common law side of the court with a trial
by jury as an incident. The words "in such action" in the succeeding
clause are all that are troublesome. But we do not regard them as
meaning that the seaman may have the benefit of the new rules if he
sues on the law side of the court, but not if he sues on the admiralty
side. Such a distinction would be so unreasonable that we are unwill-
ing to attribute to Congress a purpose to make it. A more reasonable
view, consistent with the spirit and purpose of the statute as a whole,
is that the words are used in the sense of "an action to recover damages
for such injuries," the emphasis being on the object of the suit rather
than the jurisdiction in which it is brought. So we -think the ref er-
ence is to all actions brought to recover compensatory damages under
the new rules as distinguished from the allowances covered by the.
-old rules, usually consisting of wages and the expense of maintenance
and cure. . . In this view the statute leaves the injured seaman free
under the general law-Sections 24 (par. 3) and 256 (par. 3) of the
Judicial Code. . . . to assert his right of action under the new rules on
the admiralty side of the court."
This promulgation of a procrustean rule applicable alike to common
law and admiralty courts is not necessary to vindicate the validity of
the statute. Frothn the time of the Judiciary Act, where the right to
a common law remedy was first recognized, it has never been held
that either the rule of liability or the measure of recovery had to be
'Ibid., at p. 39o, 44 Sup. Ct. at p. 395.
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the same in the common law and admiralty courts., In a collision case
you can sue at common law or libel in admiralty; but if it develops
that both are in fault, you recover half damages in admiralty4
and fail at common law.5 A passenger injured on a ship fails if he
sues at common law and is guilty of contributory negligence, but
recovers damages in admiralty proportioned to the relative degrees of
negligence of the parties." The right of Congress to create a new
cause of action and limit its enforcement to a certain forum ought to
be clear. This is not "withdrawing" anything from the admiralty;
for you cannot withdraw a thing from a party who never had it. The
very next sentence of this statute limits a death action to the common
law court, for it gives no election like the first sentence. And yet the
jurisdiction of the admiralty courts over death actions on navigable
waters has been repeatedly recognized by the Supreme Court.7
The opinion and briefs of counsel assume that the Federal Employers
Liability Act is the one adopted by the statute. This being true, where
are we landed by this opinion applying the words "in such action"
to libels in admiralty? Prior to this act, the maintenance and cure
doctrine gave the seaman a limited right of recovery for
a personal injury even where he was solely negligent.8 It also gave
him a right in case of sickness to me'dical treatment and wages.9  But
"The moiety rule of damages in collision cases was established in this country
by Mr. Justice Nelson's opinion in The Catharine v. Dickinson (1854, U.. S.)
i7 How. 17o. The principle of that decision has been uniformly followed.
The North Star (1882) io6 U. S. 17, I Sup. Ct. 41. And even extended to
include suits by passengers injured in the collision of equally negligent vessels.
The Washington (i869, U. S.) 9 Wall 513.
'Cayzer v. Carron Co. (1884, H. L.) L. R. 9 A. C. 873; Belden v. Chase (1893)
I5o U. S. 674, 14 Sup. Ct. 264.
'The lower federal courts at first were in conflict on this point, the greater
number of them allowing a proportionate recovery subject to the discretion of
the trial judge. The Truro (1887, E. D. N. Y.) 31 Fed. 158; The Wanderer
(1884, E. D. La.) 20 Fed. i4o; contra: Peterson v. Chandos (188o, D. Or.)
4 Fed. 645. The Supreme Court decided the question in favor of the majority.
The Max Morris v. Curry (18go) 137 U. S. I, 'I Sup. Ct 29.
'No recovery for a wrongful death may be had in admiralty without the aid
of a statute. The Harrisburg (1886) 119 U. S. 199, 7 Sup. Ct. 140. But the
Supreme Court has asserted jurisdiction of such causes and has applied state
statutes in granting relief. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Kierejewski
(1923) 261 U. S. 479, 43 Sup. Ct. 418.
' The Chico (9o5, N. D. Calif.) 14o Fed. 568. In these cases, as in those to
which the fellow-servant rule would be a complete defense at law, the recovery
is only expenditures on hospital charges and medical services. City of
Alexandria (1883, S. D. N. Y.) 17 Fed. 390.
'These unusual advantages given to ailing seamen apparently were introduced
into American admiralty law by Mr. Justice Story, in an opinion exhaustively
reviewing the law of the then principal maritime nations. Harden v. Gordon
(1823, C. C. D. Me.) 2 Mason, 541. In elaborating the principles, he said:
"The title to be cured at the expense of the ship is co-extensive with the service
COMMENTS
the Federal Employers Liability Act bases the right of recovery for
personal injuries upon some negligence or disregard of statutory
precautions by the employer. 10 If it "applies" to libels in admiralty
for personal injuries to seamen, the admiralty court must "apply" it
in its entirety, and limit his recovery for personal injuries to cases
involving some element of negligence on the part of the employer; for
the maintenance and cure doctrine, like Noah's weary dove, can find
no resting place above its cheerless waters. And so the result of this
construction is to destroy the seaman's right to treatment for personal
injuries under the maintenance and cure doctrine and limit that doc-
trine to the privilege of medical treatment during sickness. True, the
opinion in a previous sentence (quoted ante) speaks of his right to
invoke the old rules, but nevertheless the result stated must, it is sub-
mitted, logically and inevitably follow.
The words "in such action" occur three times in the statute under
consideration. Congress must have meant them to have the same
meaning -in all three places. It is well known that a seaman may
proceed either in rem or in personam in the admiralty to enforce any
rights that he may have arising out of a personal injury. Hence, if
the words "in such action" mean what the court says, the last sentence
to the statute may be thus expressed: Jurisdiction in a common law
action under the statute or in a libel in ren or in personam in admiralty
shall be under the court of the district in which the defendant employer
resides, or in which his principal office is located. And so, if the
Court is right, the seaman can libel in ren only when his ship happens
to come to the owner's home port, and not in any port where he may
catch her!
The inclusion of proceedings in admiralty in the word "action" is
a departure from previous practice. In the lexicon of admiralty there
is no such word. It will be sought vainly among the Admiralty Rules
of the Supreme Court." The Constitution speaks of "cases of admir-
alty and maritime jurisdiction.' 2  The Judiciary Act of 1789 calls
them "causes of admiralty jurisdiction."1 3  They are frequently
in the ship. The seaman is to be cured for injuries and sickness occurring while
he is in the ship's service. It is the benefit from the service which constitutes
the ground-work of the claim .... The sickness or other injury may occasion a
temporary or permanent disability; but that is not a ground for indemnity.
They are not in any just sense liable for consequential damages." Reed v.
Canfield (1832, C. C. D. Mass.) I Summ. 195, 198. The doctrine was adopted
by the Supreme Court in The Osceola (i9o2) 189 U. S. I58, 23 Sup. Ct. 483.
The lower courts regularly apply it. The Luckenbach (igio, C. C. A. 4th)
178 Fed. Ioo4, ioi C C. A. 663.
"Act of April 22, i9o8 (35 Stat. at L. 65) as amended by Act of April 5,
1910 (36 Stat. at L. 291).
(1920) 254 U. S. 671, 40 Sup. Ct. vii.
U. S. Const., Art. III, sec. 2.
"U. S. Rev. Sts. 1873, secs. 563, 565, 575, 629, 631, 648, 692, 698, 7N1, 862,
913, 9r4, 940.
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described as "suits in admiralty." If there is any instance in the sta-
tutes where they are spoken of as "actions," it has escaped the Writer's
attention. 4
In Atkins v. Disintegrating Co. 5 it was held that the provision for-
bidding suits against a defendant in any other district than that whereof
he is an inhabitant did not apply to proceedings in admiralty, and did
not prevent an admiralty proceeding by foreign attachment wherever
any assets of the debtor could be found. In Re Louisville Under-
writers8 it was held to the same effect, and that a libel in personam
could be instituted against a foreign corporation wherever service could
be had. If therefore the words "in such action" include an admiralty
proceeding, the seaman must bring his libel in personam for personal
injuries in the district in which the defendant employer resides or in
which is his principal office, and cannot acquire jurisdiction in any other
district or in a foreign port by a process of foreign attachment; and
the above decisions are inapplicable in view of the concluding sentence
of the act in question.
Prior to this decision, the meaning of the act could hardly have
been considered doubtful. Its simple and natural construction is, that
the seaman may proceed at common law to recover damages for per-
sonal injury where under similar circumstances a railway employee
could recover (involving some element of negligence on the part of
the employer); but with an election to proceed in the admiralty to
enforce his rights under the maintenance and cure doctrine as thereto-
fore applied in the admiralty courts (not necessarily involving any
element of negligence). It is a good illustration of a rule of construc-
tion going back as far as Coke on Littleton: "Quoties in verbis nulla est
ambiguitas, ibi nulla expositio contra verba fienda est."
It is noteworthy that the construction put upon the act by the Court
in the particular case under discussion appears for the first time in this
opinion: Neither the opinion of the lower court nor the briefs of
counsel in the Supreme Court show a trace of it.
NoSFoLK, VA. RoBERT M. HUGHES.
1 The English courts have also held that the term "action" did not apply
to admiralty proceedings. Lord Esher, in discussing a private act said: "The
word 'action' mentioned in the section in question was not applicabl, when the
Act was passed, to the procedure of the Admiralty Court. Admiralty actions
were then called 'suits' or 'causes'; moreover the Admiralty Court was not
called and was not one of His Majesty's courts of Law." The Longford
(1889, C. A.) L. R. i4 Prob. Div. 34, at p. 37. In a later case it was held
that the word "actions" in section IoI of the County Courts Act of I888 did
not include actions on the Admiralty side of that Court. The Theodora [I897]
P. 279.
15 (1873, U. S.) i8 Wall. 272.
" (i8go) I 4 U. S. 488, Io Sup. Ct. 587.
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THE JUVENILE COURT IN NEW YORK
A recent juvenile court provision in N. Y. Laws, 1924, ch. 254, gives
to New York City a much advanced type of legislation in this field. An
examination of the New York statutes dearly reveals the antecedent
evolution in intelligent social policy toward wayward children.' A
statute passed in 1877,2 requiring separate treatment of child and adult
offenders, first indicated the realization -of the danger of exposing
impressionable minds to hardened criminals. By 18923 sufficient prog-
ress had been made to provide for separate trials and dockets for child
offenders. Another phase of development was reached with the estab-
lishment in I9O24 of the first children's court in the United States to
have a separate building and administrative independence of any other
court. The present act, giving almost complete independence from other
courts,5 and providing that all actions be civil instead of criminal,"
broadly represents the features found most successful in prior enact-
ments.7  The statute provides for the creation of the necessary court
machinery, confers practically exclusive jurisdictions over all children
sixteen years of age or under,9 and provides suitable non-penal systems
of parole and institutional commitment.1O
The essential officers include six full time justices," a probation staff,
and medical advisers. There is no jury." The court is, in short, the
' Origin of the Juvenile Court and Laws for the Betterment of Children (19o7)
4o CHIc. LEGAL NEWS, 177.
SN. Y. Laws, 1877, ch. 428.
'N. Y. Laws, i892, ch. 217, amending sec. 291 N. Y. Penal Code.
'N. Y. Laws, 19o2, ch. 590.
'N. Y. Laws, 1924, ch. 254, see. 7.
'Ibid., sec. 56, "No child shall be denominated a criminal by reason of ....
adjudication, nor shall such adjudication be denominated a conviction."
"Juvenile court laws appear in every state except Connecticut, Wyoming, and
Maine. Even these states have partial programs in force. Conn. Gen. Sts. 1918,
sees. 1856, I859, amended by Conn. Sts. 1919, ch. iio; Maine Rev. Sts. 1976.
clh. 64, sec. 53, amended by Laws, 1917, ch. 297; Wyo. Laws, 1920, ch. 242,
et seq.
'As in several other states, crimes punishable by death or life imprisonment
are specifically excepted. N. Y. Laws, I924. ch. 254, secs. 2, 7; Mass. Gen.
Laws, 1921, cL. IIg, sec. 74. And others allow the judge in his discretion to sur-
render jurisdiction. See Ohio Gen. Code, 1921, sec. 168r.
"Ibid., sec. 2. Fourteen other states place the age limit at 16 years; thirteen
at 17 years; eighteen at I8 years; and one at 20.
"The constitutionality of such statutes is now well established. This illustrates
the familiar doctrine that a chancery court acting as parens patriae has powers
superior to those of the natural parent when necessary to aid or protect the
child. 18 L.R.A. (N.s.) 886, note; 45 L.R.A. (N.s.) 908, note.
' Only high grade lawyers of at least five years practice are eligible, the
salary being $r2,ooo a year; in sharp contrast to over-worked police court )udges.
N. Y. Laws, 1924, ch. 254, sec. 6; Conn. Gen. Sts. 1918, sec. 1859.
" Much conflict has arisen as to the right of a juvenile to a jury trial. Although
nearly half of the states provide for jury trials, it seems that the informal nature
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focal point of a combined legal and sociological system, before which
the child comes, not to be prosecuted, but as a subject of scientific inves-
tigation and sympathetic treatment. The importance of skilled medical
examinations is evidenced by the fact that of one group of 126 offenders
before the Chicago Court, of an average age of 18.95 years, tests
revealed an average mental development of 12.6 years.
13 Fortunately,
New York, in line with some twenty-six other states, sees the possibilities
of crime prevention by curing child defectives, and has provided for
medical examination and treatment in its new statute.'4 At the same
time, probation officers are created to investigate the environment of
offenders.15 That the effect of harsh surroundings is of no petty nature
is shown by the number of felonies coming before the Chicago Juvenile
Court-i374 in 1914, and 1784 in 1915.1 Often a complete reclama-
tion can be achieved by environmental change, and in any event a proper
disposition of the particular case can be made only if all the available
facts are brought to bar with the offender.
Once the preliminary history is secured, the procedure should be
adapted to win the child's co6peration in discovering the cause of his
offense and the best method of correction. To this end, the new statute
excludes spectators 17 and brings the child informally before the two or
three necessary court officers. It is to be hoped that the power of the
justices to establish procedural rules 8 will be exercised to abandon the
usual strict rules of evidence. Decisions refusing to recognize a privi-
lege from repeating children's confidences might seriously impair the
practical attainment of juvenile court ideals.
19 At the conclusion of
the trial the court faces its most difficult task. After examining the
child's testimony in the light of the previously secured physical and
of proceedings makes the effective use of a jury nearly impossible. Commonwealth
v. Fisher (19o5) 213 Pa. 48, 62 Atl. i98; Minn. Laws, 1917, cl. 397, sec. 2;
45 L.R.A. (N.s.) goS, 912, note.
'(917) 21 LAW NOTES, 22.
"Upon medical recommendation, treatment in appropriate hospitals is provided
for at the city's expense. N. Y. Laws, 1924, ch. 254, sec. 25. See also, Minn.
Laws, 1917, ch. 397, sec. io; Va. Code, 1923, secs. 1910, 1913.
" A majority of states provide for such preliminary investigations. N. Y.
Laws, 1924, ch. 254, secs. 24, 44; Kan- Gen. Sts. 1915, sec. 3067. And New
York decides a conflict by requiring notice of impending proceedings to be
given at this time to the parent or guardian in order to make any subsequent
decree binding upon them. Ibid., secs. 13, 14.
6 Supra note 13.
'IN. Y. Laws, 1924, ch. 254, sec. 59. Some twenty other states provide for
the exclusion of the public in juvenile cases. Other states forbid publication of
such court records, accounts of cases, and photographs or sketches of the child
offender. Summary of Juvenile Court Legislation (i919) U. S. FEDERAL
CHILDREN'S BUREAU, Publication 70, p. 36.
IN. Y. Laws, 1924, ch. 254, sec. I6.
"Judge Lindsey was fined for contempt for refusing to repeat children's testi-
mony received in confidence. Lindsey v. People (i919) 66 Colo. 343, i8I Pac.
531; (I919) 29 YALE LAW JoURNAL, 356; see 9 A. L. R. iio6, note.
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environmental data, treatment for the individual case must be pre-
scribed. Other than dismissal, the three major possibilities under the
New York statute are appointment of a guardian, institutional commit-
ment, and probation.
2 0
A guardianship under an individual or association is often a most
satisfactory disposition of orphans or children whose parents have
been decreed unfit for their care."- It usually involves custody of both
the person and the property of the child, though some states give con-
trol of the person only. 2 Altogether, about twenty-three states regu-
larly make use of this remedy,2 although the difficulty of securing com-
petent guardians has greatly lessened its frequency of application.
Institutional commitment provides both hospital treatnient for defec-
tives24 and institutional control for neglected children and delinquents.2 5
The former is prescribed until a cure is effected, and the latter usually is
ordered during minority. The whole theory of such confinement is based
upon the child's susceptibility to good training Consequently, inmates
are subjected to regular habits of living, taught useful trades, and in
every way encouraged to become useful citizens upon their release.
England uses this type of treatment very generally under the name of the
"Borstal System."2  Yet at its best, institutional treatment is often
unsatisfactory. Hence where possible, such commitment as well as
guardianship is being increasingly avoided in favor of probation,2 7 which
leaves the child in his home subject to more or less strict control by a
probation officer.28  Given competent officers, it may well be said that
"probation is now recognized to be the surest as well as the most
economical means of reformation. 29
The New York statute exemplifies much that is best in juvenile legis-
lation. But "the passage of laws . .. alone cannot guarantee good
work. Intelligent co6peration from the community is also essential if
year in and year out efficient service is to be rendered." 0
In the new statute, sec. 24 (d) provides for a fine, and sec. 24 (f) allows
discharge to an official as a public charge, among other remedies.
2 The power to select a guardian is conferred in sec. 7 (I) and sec. 24 (g).
of the statute.
I Idaho Laws, igg, ch. 16I, secs. 8, 12.
'Waters, Juvenile Court Procedure (1922) 13 JOUR. CRIM. L. 44.
" Supra note 14.
'For the statutory definition of "neglected" and "delinquent," see N. Y. Laws,
1924, ch. 254, sec. 2 (2) (4).
.Authorized by (i9o8) 8 Edw. 7, c. 59. See (1912) 76 JusT. P. iog.
'The N. Y. statute, sec. 24 (g) permits decrees of probation for not more
than 5 years, or until majority.
'A question has been raised elsewhere whether such control decreed during
minority could be defeated by the childfs marriage, but the better view
seems to deny any such effect. Re Willis (1916) 30 Calif. App. 188, 157 Pac.
81g; (1918) 25 CASE AND COMMENT, 35.
"Emerson, Children's Court Work (I918) 9 JOUR. CRim. L. ion.
' (915) 6 JouR. CRam. L. 444.
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JOINDER OF PARTIES AND TRIAL BY JURY
A recent New York'decision following the liberal rule adopted from
the English reformed procedure' reveals clearly the problems arising
from the greater freedom of joinder of parties permitted under the
new Civil Practice Act.2 In Akely v. Kinnicutt (1924) 238 N. Y. 466,
144 N. E. 682, one hundred and ninety-three plaintiffs joined in an
action for damages against the defendant who had induced them sever-
ally to purchase varying amounts of stock by circulating an alleged
fraudulent prospectus. The complaint set up one hundred and ninety-
three different causes of action, one in favor of each plaintiff. The
court decided that the joinder was proper and affirmed, the lower
courts denial of the defendant's motion for severance of the causes
of action on the ground of misjoinder of parties plaintiff. The def end-
ant o]jected that the court had unfairly deprived him of a new jury
for each cause of action. With reasonable distress he declared that
he "will be faced with the uncertainties of a trial before a single jury
in an action brought by a horde of plaintiffs all shouting that they
have been defrauded and tricked by wealthy and unscrupulous defend-
ants" and that "confronted with all of these causes of action at one
trial any jury might readily, though incorrectly, gain the impression
that where there is so much smoke there must be some fire."
3  The
constitutionality and even the desirability of section 2o9 of the Civil
Practice Act is fairly questioned by such procedural limitations of the
right to trial by jury.
4
It seems that the legislatures, upheld by the courts, have already
subjected the right of trial by jury to more serious restrictions than
the defendant here complains of.5 It would be surprising, therefore,
if the legislature could not direct the procedural administration of jury
'For the present English rule see THE ANNUAL PRACTICE (1924) Order i6,
rule 1.
"'All persons may be joined in one action as plaintiffs, in whom any right to
relief in respect of or arising out of the same transaction or series of trans-
actions is alleged to exist whether jointly, severally or in the alternative, where
if such persons brought separate actions any common question of law or fact
would arise. ..... .. " N. Y. C. P. A. 1921, sec. 2og. Before the new Civil
Practice Act the general code rule in New York permitted a joinder of parties
and actions only where the plaintiffs had a common interest in the subject of
the action and in the relief demanded. For a more comprehensive discussion
of joinder of parties and actions see CoMMENTS (1923) 32 YALE LAW JOURNAL,
384; Sunderland, Joinder of Actions (i92o) i8 MIcH. L. Rrv. 571; Clark, The
Code Cause of Action (1924) 33 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 817.
'Appellant's brief before the Court of Appeals, p. 8.
"'The trial by jury in all cases in which it has been heretofore used shall
remain inviolate forever." Constitution of New York (1846) Art. I, sec. 2.
'Act extending the jurisdiction of justice of the peace courts employing a
jury of six. N. Y. Laws, i86i, ch. i58; Dawson v. Horan (i868, N. Y.) ST
Barb. 459. The special jury act regulating the mode of selecting jurors 
for
special jury service, limited the eligibility of citizens of certain localities to
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trials to render them more efficient." As a jury is substantially pro-
vided, the liberal construction of the Practice Act, in an endeavor to
achieve the greatest convenience in trials, does not burden the defend-
ant. If all the plaintiffs had assigned their rights of action to one
person, a single jury would have heard all the claims.7 How, then,
are the defendant's constitutional rights impaired by the procedure
adopted in the instant case? On speculation, it is even conceivable
that the combined attack of "this mob of plaintiffs" might appeal to
the sporting instincts of the jury and direct its sympathy to the
defendant.
The standard of joinder in the instant case is properly one of con-
venience8 applied to a series of claims arising from closely related trans-
actions involving the same questions of law and fact. The evidence
on the issue of the prospectus, the main issue of each case around which
the greatest struggle is centered, would be identical in each of the one
hundred and ninety-three causes of action. The disposition of this
mass of evidence at one time in itself shows that the Practice Act and
this case following it are sound in principle.
Although the decision is therefore to be commended, the objections
of the' defendant against a trial before a single jury seem of sMme
substantial weight. The procedure best adapted to obviate these
objections would be a motion to split the issues and to try the common
the jury list and interfered with the right of challenging jurors enjoyed under
the common law. N. Y. Laws, I896, ch. 378; People v. Dunn (I899) I57 N. Y.
528, 52 N. E. 572. Indeed, laws denying a jury trial altogether were held consti-
tutional as correct procedural measures. An act providing for a reference of
controversies between the receivers of insolvent insurance companies and their
stockholders. N. Y. Laws, 1862, ch. 412; Sands v. Kiibark (1863) 27 N. Y. 147.
See also Mechanics Lien Act, N. Y. Laws, x885, ch. 342; Schillinger v. Arnott
(1897) 152 N. Y. 584, 46 N. E. 956. See Scott, Fundamentals of Procedure in
Actions at Law (922) 70 et seq.
'"The Seventh Amendment, indeed, does not attempt to regulate matters of
pleading or practice, or to determine in what way issues shall be framed by which
questions of fact are to be submitted to a jury. Its aim is not to preserve mere
matters of form and procedure but substance of right. This requires that
questions of fact in common law actions shall be settled by a jury, and that the
court shall not assume directly or indirectly to take from the jury or to itself such
prerogative. So long as this substance of right is preserved the procedure by
which this result shall be reached is wholly within the discretion of the legislature,
and the courts may not set aside any legislative provision in this respect because
the form of action-the mere manner in which questions are submitted-is different
from that which obtained at the common law." Brewer, J. in Walker v. Southern
Pacific R. R. (x897) 165 U. S. 593, 596, 17 Sup. Ct. 421, 422. See Scott, op. cit.
supra note 5, at p. 74.
"Beedict v. Guardian Trust Co. (i9oi, Ist Dept.) 58 App. Div. 3o2, 68 N. Y.
Supp. Io82
"All but twelve of the plaintiffs live outside of New York state, some as far
away as California and even Canada., Their claims vary in amount from $5o to
$75,ooo. The obvious impracticability of expecting many of these plaintiffs to
bring separate actions is a further reason for justifying a joinder.
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issue of the prospectus for all the claims at once before the jury. If
the finding on the prospectus should establish its honesty, the whole
action might be ended with dispatch. But if the finding should be
adverse to the defendant,, the accessory facts in each claim would be
considered in light of the finding on the prospectus, and might be
quickly and fairly disposed of one at a time.10 The court would not
be justified in upholding the defendant's objections by assuming that
the jury would be governed by its feelings to the exclusion of its reason
and would be impressed by numbers alone. Nor should it assume that
the trial court-would be unable to present the issues clearly to the jury
or that the jury would refuse to follow the instructions. If the unusu-
ally large number of claims did appear to prejudice the jury so that
it no longer occupied an impartial position, the judge would not only
have the power, but it would be his duty under the Practice Act to
stop the proceedings and order separate trials on the several claims. 1
It is possible that the defendant might avoid a jury trial altogether
by filing a counterclaim12 in the nature of the old equitable bill of peace
to obtain a settlement on a single comprehensive issue of so many
troublesome claims.' Thus an equitable issue would be presented for
trial. He might also attempt to present an equitable issue by counter-
claiming for a declaratory judgment on the issue of the prospectus
alone. It is not settled, however, that the remedy of the declaratory
judgment is purely equitable.' 4 A declaration finding the prospectus
9 Smith v. Western Pacific Ry. (1911) 2o3 N. Y. 499, 96 N. E. iio6. "The
court, in its discretion, may order one or more issues to be separately tried prior
to any trial of the other issues in the case." N. Y. C. C. P. 1907, sec. 973;
N. Y. C. P. A. 1921, sec. 443 (3) ; see 2 Conn. Gen. Sts. 1918, sec. 5755.
a° If the finding on the prospectus was adverse to the defendant he might also
well choose to settle the individual claims rather than go to the expense of trying
each clainv In fact his position before the court and jury, might be seriously
prejudiced if he continued to litigate each claim after the main issue was decided
against him.
S",, .... provided that if upon the application of any party it shall appear that
such joinder may embarrass or delay the trial of the action, the court may order
separate trials or make such other order as may be expedient, and judgment may
be given for such one or more of the plaintiffs as may be found to be entitled to
relief, for the relief to which he or they may be entitled." N. Y. C. P. A. 1921,
sec. 209.
' Cf. National Aniline & Chem. Co. v. Arzhold (1924, S. D. N. Y.) 298 Fed.
755, where, in an action at law, a counterclaim praying for cancellation of a
contract was held triable in equity.
Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (4th ed. 1918) secs. 243-248. See Board of
Supervisors v. Deyoe (1879) 77 N. Y. 229; National Park Bank v. Goddard
(1892) 131 N. Y. 494, 3o N. E. 566; Kellogg v. Siple (1896, 3d Dept.) ix App.
Div. 458, 42 N. Y. Supp. 379; see Fletcher, The Jurisdiction of Equity Relating
to Multiplicity of Suits (1915) 24 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 642, where equitable settle-
ment of numerous claims is recommended that convenience may be served.
Contra: Tribette v. Illinois Central Ry. (1892) 70 Miss. 182, 12 So. 32.
' On this point see Borchard, The Declaratory Judgment-A Needed Procedural
Reform (1918) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 27, 28, 207 (and note 141). III and 117
The New York Rules of Civil Practice, Rule 213, treat the granting of a jury
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valid would save everyone concerned in the action a considerable
amount of time and expense, and a declaration either way would oper-
ate largely to settle the main issue of the suit without prejudicing the
defendant's case with a jury trial.
As the various claims arose from the defendant's one act of dis-
seminating the alleged fraudulent prospectus, question arises whether
the plaintiff might not have alleged only a single cause of action. Out
of abundant caution he alleged one hundred and ninety-three causes
of action, and the resulting complaint comprised one thousand and
ninety folios covering three hundred and'sixty-four pages of the printed
record. Of the eighteen paragraphs alleged in each cause of action,
sixteen were identical.Y5 The other two differed in each instance as
to the separate allegations of purchase and as to the number of shares
bought at the different times entailing a consequent difference in the
damage suffered by each plaintiff. This identity of allegation was
properly relied on as showing that a large proportion of the evidence
offered -in each case would. be the same as to each right of action
alleged. A view of the cause of action as referring to the operative
facts giving a right to relief might, well lead to the conclusion that
since the ground of suit is substantially identical in all the claims there
is only one cause of action, a conclusion which would here render
permissible a desirable simplification of the complaint.16 "
APPORTIONMENT OF STOCK DIVIDENDS BETWEEN LIFE TENANT
AND REMAINDERMAN'
A recent decision of the Supreme Court of Ohio has upset an almost
unanimous trend of twenty-five years duration. Deciding the question
for the first time in that Court, and reversing what was apparently
the opposite tendency in its lower courts,2 it has adopted in Lamb v.
trial in actions for declaratory judgments as discretionary with the court. Since
courts ordinarily refuse to make declarations purely of fact where no legal rela-
tions are involved, the request for a declaration should be carefully framed to
present an issue concerning the legal relations of the parties. See Borchard,
op. cit. supra, at p. 115.
" Paragraphs 1-14 of the first cause of action are incorporated by reference in
each of the succeeding causes of action. Paragraphs I5 and 17 are repeated in
each cause of action and would have been incorporated by reference if it had not
been necessary to use the words "this plaintiff" in referring to the particular
plaintiff in question.
"This view is developed in Clark, The Code Cause of Action, (I924) 33 YALE
LAW JOURNAL, 817. It was applied by the New York Court of Appeals in Cleve-
land Cliffs Iron Co. v..Keusch (1923) 237 N. Y. 533, 143 N. F. 731, noted in
(1923) 126 Court of Appeals Records, i, although, as Professor Clark points out,
the cases are in much confusion on this subject.
'Excellent statements of the rules in this subject, their variations, and sup-
porting cases, have appeared in COmMENTS (I924) 33 YALE LAW JoRNAL, 774;
Noms (1923) 23 COL. L. REv. 369; 50 L. R. A. (N. s.) 5IO; 2 Cook, Corporations
(8th ed. 1923) sec. 552-56o.
2 Ohio Savings Bank and Trust Co. v. Clark (916) 7 Ohio App. 6.
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Lehmann (1924, Ohio) 143 N. E. 276, the Massachusetts rule that a
dividend payable in stock of.the declaring company is capital. As such, it
goes to the remainderman under a trust estate, not to the life tenant."
The decision rests squarely on the doctrine that the directors of a cor-
poration are the final authority as to finances within the corporation.
When they vote not only not to distribute surplus earnings, but to use
such funds permanently as capital, it is beyond the province of the
court to rule that earnings have been disbursed.4
The Pennsylvania-New York rule, commonly called the apportion-
ment rule, gives stock dividends to the life tenant so long as the value
of the corpus is not impaired.5 The courts adopting this view reject
the vote of the directors as having any force in the division of the
estate between the life tenant and remainderman. 6 Between the latter
it is a question for the court to decide exactly what the testator meant
when he stipulated "income ' 7 to the life tenant."
The apportionment rule is unfortunately blessed with an implica-
tion of fairness. What could be fairer than to give the life tenant
the earnings over and above the unimpaired corpus of the trust ?9 But
observation of the actual application of the rule raises some doubt as
to its inherent fairness.' 0 In applying the apportionment rule the courts
'Minot v. Paine (1868) 99 Mass. ioi; Alsop v. DeKoven (19o3) 205 IIl.
309, 68 N. E. 930; see Richardson v. Richardson (1884) 75 Me. 570; Cook,
op. cit. supra note i, sec. 555. The Massachusetts rule gives all cash dividends
to the life tenant. Talbot v. Milliken (915) 221 Mass. 367, io8 N. E. io6o.
Also "property dividends" payable in stock of other corporations. Smith v.
Cotting (1918) 231 Mass. 42, 120 N. E. 177.
'The Ohio court also found assistance in the holding of the United States
Supreme Court in accord. Gibbons v. Mahon (189o) 136 U. S. 549, IO Sup. Ct.
1O57. And in the holding of the same court that stock dividends are not
income for purposes of taxation. Towne v. Eisner (igi) 245 U. S. 418, 38
Sup. Ct. 158.
'Earp's Appeal (1857) 28 Pa. 368; see Appeal of Boyer (199o) 224 Pa. 144,
73 Atl. 320; McLouth v. Hunt (1897) 154 N. Y. 179, 48 N. E. 548; Matter of
Osborne (1913) 209 N. Y. 45o, 1O3 N. E. 723; 50 L. R. A. (H. s.) 51o; 2 Cook,
op. cit. supra, sec. 554.
'McLouth v. Hunt, supra note 5.
"The testator may, of course, stipulate to whom a stock-dividend shall go.
The difficulty arises out of the testator's use of words, "income," "net income,"
"issues and profits" and the like, without more specific directions. NoTms (1923)
23 COL. L. REv. 369.
"The apportionment rule apportions extraordinary cash dividends as well
as'stock dividends. McKeown's Estate (1919) 263 Pa. 78, io6 Atl. 189. While
apportionment of cash dividends is not discussed, it is believed that it also is
objectionable because it is impossible to apply it accurately.
' "The very purpose-of our decision is to make the corpus of the trust fund
have exactly the same value after the division of dividends as when the trust
was originally created." Matter of Osborne, supra note 5, at p. 485.
"'Sturgis v. Roche (1924, Sup. Ct. Spec. T.) 122 Misc. 779, 2o4 N. Y. Supp.
859; In re Beins' Will (1924, Surro. Ct) 205 N. Y. Supp. 367; In re Waterman's
Estate (1924, Pa.) 124 Atl. I66.
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must preserve the value of the corpus unimpaired. Having rejected a
vote of the board of directors as binding in these cases, and launching an
independent inquiry, the courts apparently turn about, and, in their
search for the value of the corpus, accept valuations as determined by the
"Treasurer and Vice President,""' or fixed in part by a vote of the stock-
holders.1 2  The first cases figured the value of the corpus from the
market value of the shares on the day of the testator's death.1 It was
soon seen that this measure of value was inadequate, and the test in later
Pennsylvania cases seems to be "actual value."'1 4  In New York we find
the courts making findings of "intrinsic value"' 5 from the books, records,
and reports of the corporation. In a very recent case the court made
its finding on the basis of a report of capital and earnings furnished by
the executor. 6 Through all of the decisions one is conscious of faulty
methods of valuation. To ascertain the value of the corpus the
courts must order an independent and complete inventory of assets as
of the time of the testator's death.17 In cases where the courts must
1' "The stock was carried by the trustees at a value of $zoo per share. It was
sold for $415 per share. These prices may be assumed to represent with
accuracy the respective values of the stock at the time the trust fund was
established, and at the time the stock was sold. The trustees were respectively
president and treasurer of the company and necessarily cognizant of the value
of its assets, and consequently of its capital stock." Matter of Schaefer (1917,
ist Dept.) 178 App. Div. i7, i65 N. Y. Supp. xg, aff'd. 222 N. Y. 533, ii8 N. E.
i076. "This appears from the uncontradicted testimony of .... the Treasurer
and, .... Vice President." Thayer v. Burr (1911) 20i N. Y. i55, 94 N. E. 6o4,
"All of the above findings [of value] were founded upon the uncontradicted
testimony of the Treasurer of the Pure Oil Co. . . . " McKeown's Estate,
supra note 8.
It should be noted that the placing of the burden of evidence upon the
remainderman to sho., "value" actually defeats justice since the cost of proving
"value" would in many cases be more than the value of the remainder.
" "The railroad property sold to . .. . is replaced by the $6o,oooooo which
was the price at which the stockholders were content to sell, and which must
be accepted as the full value of the coal properties sold. There is certainly no
proof on the record by which any other value could be arrived at." Sturgis v.
Roche, supra note io, at p. 785, 204 N. Y. Supp. at p. 864.
"Earp's Appeal, supra note 5.
a judicial decree should go down through the shifting sands of the
stock market until it reaches the solid rock of actual value." Moss' Appeal
(1879) 83 Pa. 264. Stokes' Estate (1913) 24o Pa. 277, 87 At. 971 seems to
say that "actual value" and "intrinsic value" are the same, and that "market
value" may aid in ascertaining "intrinsic value."
"s "The intrinsic value of the trust investment is to be ascertained by dividing the
capital and surplus of the corporation existing at the time of the creation of
the trust by the number of shares outstanding which gives the value of each
share." Matter of Osborne, supra note 5, at p. 485.
"8 See In re Bemis' Will, supra note io, at p. 372.
"While it is not assumed that the problem is the same, the experience of the
courts and state commissions in "valuing" the assets of public service corpora-
tions for purposes of taxation sufficiently illustrates that anything other than
a minute inquiry will not disclose real value.
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find value of the assets of one of our modern industrial giants,"" the
cost is so great as to render the rule of apportionment impracticable.'
Other questions arise. What is value? The economists seem to be
in disagreement.2 0  Is it the number of dollars represented at the time
of the testator's death, or the purchasing power of that many dollars ?"
In valuing the physical assets, is it what they cost less depreciation
up to the beginning of the trust, or is it replacement value? Should
the parts be valued at their piece price, or as part of a going concern ?2
All of these questions are left unanswered simply because the courts
have not pursued their inquiry to fundamental facts. The decisions,
therefore, have been based upon an approximation of "value." They
represent, not apportionment, but a more or less arbitrary allotment of
stock dividends, a part to the life tenant, and at times a part to the
remainderman.
A further difficulty presents itself when it is attempted to ascertain
the present value of the corpus. In valuing a going concern, present
value is capitalized expected net annual income. 3 Here, an element
of speculation and prophecy enters. The court must assume future
income to arrive at present value. Where that value is being used to
test whether the original corpusis being preserved, are we not encounter-
ing something very like the vicious circle in the rate-making problem ?24
Out of sympathy for the life tenant the apportionment rule might
be condoned were it not for certain other legal consequences which
seem to have been entirely overlooked. Valuable legal relations attach
to the ownership of stock, and those legal relations have a value which
is a part of the value of the corpus. This seems to have been recog-
nized to some extent even in the apportionment states, since there,
"rights" to subscribe to additional stock of the corporation go to the
remainderman. 25 *And even though these "rights" have a "value," no
'In re Bemis' Will, supra note io, where the court was called upon to
apportion stock dividends of five of the Standard Oil companies; in Sturgis v.
Roche, supra note i% the court had the task of valuing the capital of the
Delaware, Lackawanna, and Western Railroad.
"A further troubling factor was introduced by the decision in Thayer v.
Burr, supra note ii, where it was held that any increase by way of appreciation
of capital goes to the remainderman. This was affirmed in Matter of Schaefer,
supra note ii. Though no rule for distinguishing appreciation of capital from
company earnings has been adopted, subsequent decisions take care to recite
that they are within that rule.
"Commons, Legal Foundations of Capitalism (1924) passim. A careful read-
ing of this valuable book is convincing on the point that cursory investigations
for the purpose of ascertaining value are futile.
2 Fisher, Purchasing Power of Money (1911) passim; Stabilizing the Dollar
(292o) passim,
"Commons, supra note 20.
= Commons, op. cit. at p. 157 et seq.
'Hale, The "Physical Value" Fallacy (9zi) 30 YALE LAW JoURNAL, 710.
I Baker v. Thompson (I918, ist Dept) 181 App. Div. 469, 68 N. Y. Supp. 871;
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inquiry is made as to whether that is a value resulting from earnings
over and above the value of the corpus. 2 6 Assume this case. The
board of directors of a corporation, seeking to secure a firmer hold in
the field, distributes normal cash dividends, and transfers the greater
portion of remaining surplus earnings to capital, issuing "stock divi-
dends" therefor. As long as the "value of the corpus" is not impaired
these stock dividends go to the life tenant. The corporation, despite
these precautionary measures, suffers reverses later, and voluntarily or
involuntarily liquidates. There is a balance remaining after all credi-
tors are paid, amounting to less than the value of the assets at the
time of the creation of the trust. This balance belongs to the stock-
holders pro rata.2 7  The courts, though leaving the corpus "unim-
paired" as of the time of the apportionment, have materially reduced
the percentage holding of the corpus, and so, the amount due the
remainderman upon liquidation. When the testator purchased the
stock, he took his risk of loss with the board of directors. The appor-
tionment rule,; when it deprives the remainderman of his right to a dis-
tribution of assets based upon his original percentage of shares,
increases the risk of loss, and actually impairs the value of the corpus.
The fairness of the apportionment rule is only theoretical and elu-
sory. Its application is dangerously variable, and it is really !mfair
to the remainderman. The Supreme Court of Ohio has chosen wisely
in its adoption of the Massachusetts rule. The ad-.antage of simplicity
is obvious.
Girwood v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. (1924, Md.) 122 Atl. 132; COMMENTS
(1924) 33 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 774.
"Baker v. Thompson, supra, "The right to subscribe is an incident of the
ownership of stock." Also, Sturgis v. Roche, supra note I, is interesting in
this connection. The directors of the corporation sold its coal lands to a new
coal company for $6ooooooo. The coal company agreed to give the stock-
holders of the original corporation, pro rata, "rights" to subscribe to stock of
the new company at par. The coal lands were the only assets of the new
company. These "rights" were worth on the market $23,oooooo. The court
held that the value of the "rights" could not be deducted from the value of
the corpus as a distribution of capital and that the "rights" went to the
remainderman-they were not "income" for the life tenant, thus concluding,
apparently with no investigation whatever, that this value represented appre-
ciated capital value. In fact, this adds to the conventional classifications-
Capital and Earnings, a third, which might well be called Prizes, and Prizes
go to the remainderman.
=3 Cook, op. cit. supra note i, sec. 641, and cases there cited.
